Hardening *Cassandra* Against Byzantine Failures

Roy Friedman and Roni Licher Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

OPODIS 2017




In this research we:

- Analyze the presence of byzantine failures in Cassandra
- Suggest solutions to prevent them
- Iterate to improve common case performance
- Benchmark implementation



- Distributed Database
- Open Source
- Column Families






Cassandra

- Distributed Database
- Open Source
- Column Families
- Tunable Consistency
- Very Scalable

Scale-Up Linearity









Cassandra

- Distributed Database
- Open Source
- Column Families
- Tunable Consistency
- Very Scalable
- Great performance



[1] Cooper, Brian F., et al. "Benchmarking cloud serving systems with YCSB." *Proceedings of the 1st ACM symposium on Cloud computing*. ACM, 2010.


Scale-Up Linearity







Cassandra

- Distributed Database
- Open Source
- Column Families
- Tunable Consistency
- Very Scalable
- Great performance
- Highly adopted:









NASA


Spotify **GitHub**

Freddit ebay


NETFLIX

Cassandra - The Ring


- Distributed Hash Table
- Replication
- Full membership view (gossip based)



Client decides the number of nodes that have to acknowledge the operation




Cassandra - Handling Failures - Hinted Handoff



Cassandra - Handling Failures - Anti-Entropy

- If a node is unresponsive for long enough, the saved hint might get deleted
- Nodes can exchange Merkle Trees and sync (expensive)
- A value can be updated during a Read-Repair




• Fewer than $\frac{1}{3}$ of the nodes are Byzantine:

- Fully connected network
- Public Key Infrastructure and SSL
- Loosely synchronized clocks (not perfect)

Replication

- On writes, waiting for all nodes is not possible
- Quorums:
 - All read sets have to intersect with all write sets
 - In Cassandra majority is used:



Byzantine Replication?

f=1








Using Byzantine quorums:


• Writes and reads intersect in at least one *correct* node



Digital Signatures

- A proof for the origin of the data
- Requires a shared key

Public Key Signatures:



Symmetric Key Signatures:

Sign with a private key Verify with a private key




B cannot prove to a third party that he got a message from A

A


Slow




The proxy cannot be trusted



Write Algorithm - Plain Cassandra







Signatures and verifications (using only PKI):

Client:	Proxy:	Nodes:	Total:
Sign: 1		Sign: 3f+1	Sign: 3f+2
Verify: 2f+1	Verify: 2f+1	Verify: 3f+1	Verify: 7f+1


• Should the proxy verify the nodes signatures?




• No, if client isn't happy, contact the proxy again...



• Now, the nodes sign and only the client verify it...




• Switch to symmetric key signatures from nodes to client



Signatures and verifications:

Client: Sign: 1(p) Verify: 2f+1(s) Nodes: Sign: 3f+1(s) Verify: 3f+1(p) **Total**: Sign: 3f+1(s) & 1(p) Verify: 2f+1(s) & 3f+1(p)

- Still, not fast enough
- Switch to symmetric key signatures from client to nodes?



- If new nodes join, how can they verify the signature?
- If a node misses a write, how can it trust his neighbours?
- How can the client know which nodes are responsible for each value?

Using only symmetric signatures is tricky...



- A client signs the value with a public key signature
- Then, covers the value and signature with symmetric signatures, one for each node
- A node will verify only the symmetric signature and store the public signature



Value

Public_Sign(V)

Symmetric_Sign_Node1(V, PS) Symmetric_Sign_Node2(V, PS) Symmetric_Sign_Node3(V, PS) Symmetric_Sign_Node4(V, PS)





Verify:

Symmetric_Sign_Node2(V, PS) Store:

Value, Public_Sign(V)


- Existing nodes will use only the symmetric signatures
- New nodes / outdated nodes will use the public key signature






Signatures and verifications:

Client: Sign: 1(p) & 3f+1(s) Verify: 2f+1(s) Nodes: Sign: 3f+1(s) Verify: 3f+1(s)



- Left with only one public key signature
- Can we do it fast?

ECDSA (The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)




RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman)


 $C = M^e \mod n$

Fast Signing Slow Verification Slow Signing Fast Verification

Read Algorithm - Plain Cassandra




Read Algorithm - Hardened Cassandra



On failure, retrying with new proxy

Same as in the write path:


- Proxy does not verify, client contacts it again if necessary
- Symmetric signatures from nodes to client




Signatures and verifications:


Client: What about verifying the Verify: 2f+1(s) data signature?

Nodes: Sign: 2f+1(s) Total: Sign: 2f+1(s) Verify: 2f+1(s)





Performance - YCSB - Workload A - 50/50 Read/Writes - Achieved Throughput - More




RSA Porxy-No-Verify Half-Sym 4Nodes RSA Porxy-No-Verify Full-Sym 4Nodes


12000 Achieved throughput (ops/sec) 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 L 0 4000 6000 2000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 Requested throughput (ops/sec)


ECDSA Porxy-No-Verify Full-Sym 4Nodes

Performance - YCSB - Workload A - 50/50 Read/Writes - Latency - More



RSA Porxy-No-Verify Half-Sym 4Nodes RSA Porxy-No-Verify Full-Sym 4Nodes ECDSA Porxy-No-Verify Full-Sym 4Nodes





- Byzantine clients
- Deleting values
- Column families
- Membership

Future Work

- Improve performance
 - Introduce real batching
- Support more functionalities
 - Lightweight transactions
 - Multi data-center operations

