Broadcasting in an Unreliable SINR Model

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The Model

The Problem

The Results

The Algorithm

Signal Propagation in the SINR Model

Signal with transmission power *P* fades with distance from source.



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Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio - Model

Nodes V embedded to *metric space* (X,d). Time proceeds in *rounds*. Nodes *either send or listen*. Set of *interfering nodes I*.



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SINR
$$(u, v, I) := \frac{P/d(u, v)^{\alpha}}{N + \sum_{w \in I} P/d(w, v)^{\alpha}} \ge \beta$$

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Modeling Choices



Minimal assumptions:

- No geometric information.
- No power control.
- No additional capabilities (e.g. carrier sensing).

Silent node v receives transmission from sender u if and only if

$$\operatorname{SINR}(u,v,I) := \frac{P/d(u,v)^{\alpha}}{N + \sum_{w \in I} P/d(w,v)^{\alpha}} \ge \beta_{v}$$

Adversary chooses $\beta_{\nu} \in [\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]$ for each transmission.

$$\operatorname{SINR}(u,v,I) := \frac{P/d(u,v)^{\alpha}}{N + \sum_{w \in I} P/d(w,v)^{\alpha}} \ge \beta_{\max}$$



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No Transmission!

$$SINR(u,v,I) := \frac{P/d(u,v)^{\alpha}}{N + \sum_{w \in I} P/d(w,v)^{\alpha}} \in [\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max})$$



Adversary decides!



In standard SINR models message reception is subject to a deterministic function.

- Real wireless transmission is *inherently unstable and unreliable*.
- Adversary adds a *dynamic* component.
- The proposed adversarial model captures a seemingly stronger adversary that manipulates *all* SINR-parameters (P, N, α, β) .



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Broadcast Problem

Broadcast is solved when message M is disseminated from a distinguished source node to all other nodes in V.

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Neighborhood Dissemination Problem

Neighborhood dissemination is solved when \mathcal{M} is disseminated from $S \subseteq V$ to their Neighbors N(S) in the *communication graph* G_C .

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Neighborhood dissemination is solved when \mathcal{M} is disseminated from $S \subseteq V$ to their Neighbors N(S) in the *communication graph* G_C .

Communication graph

 $G_C := (V, \{\{u, v\} | u, v \in V, u \neq v, d(u, v) \leq r_e\})$. Defined by the set of edges among nodes within *effective communication range* r_e of each other.



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Observation: *Global Broadcast* can be solved by solving *Neighborhood Dissemination* D times where D is the *diameter* of G_C .



We want a robust randomized algorithm to solve broadcast, that works

- ... with high probability (w.h.p.), that is with probability at least $1-\frac{1}{n^c}$, for constant *c* and n := |V|.
- ... for *any strategy* of the adversary.



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Paper	Model	Broadcast
Daum et al., 2013	Reliable SINR	$\mathcal{O}(D \cdot \log n \cdot \log^* n \cdot \operatorname{polylog} R)$
Jurdzinski et al., 2014	Reliable SINR	$\mathcal{O}(D \cdot \log^2 n)$
Halldórsson et al., 2015	Reliable SINR	$\mathcal{O}((D + \log n) \cdot \operatorname{polylog} R)$
This paper	Unreliable SINR	$\mathcal{O}\big(\frac{\beta_{\max}}{\beta_{\min}} \cdot D \cdot \log n \cdot \log^* n \cdot \operatorname{polylog} R\big)$

R is the **Ratio** between the length of the *longest and shortest edge* in G_C .



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Lemma [cf. Daum et al., 2013]: Nodes $S \subseteq V$ send with probability p. If nodes $u \in S, v \in V$ are closer than a constant multiple of d_{\min}^S and are in safe transmission range r_s of each other then a safe transmission from u to v takes place with *constant* probability $\mu \in (0, p)$.



Communication Among Relatively Close Nodes

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Algorithm RobustDissemination	
For phase $\phi = 1$ to $\Theta(\log R)$ do:	
II S_{ϕ} sends with prob. $\frac{p}{Q}$ for $\mathcal{O}(Q\log n)$ rounds	$(S_1 := S)$
2 Determine DIS $S_{\phi+1}$ of $H[S_{\phi}]$	$(S_{\phi+1} \subseteq S_{\phi})$

Neighborhood Dissemination Algorithm		BURG
		ZW
Algorithm RobustDissemination		76
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- Algorithm proceeds in phases.
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- $S_{\phi+1} \subseteq S_{\phi}$ is 'thinned out'.

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- *SINR-induced graph* $H[S_{\phi}]$ contains short edges among nodes S_{ϕ} .
- Compute Dominating Independet Set.

$$(S_1 := S)$$
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- $d_{\min}^{S_{\phi}}$ doubles each phase.



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- In final phase ψ : $d_{\min}^{S_{\psi}}$ is large.



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Neighborhood Dissemination Algorithm

Algorithm RobustDissemination

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- Compute *Dominating Independet Set*.
- $d_{\min}^{S_{\phi}}$ doubles each phase.
- In final phase ψ : $d_{\min}^{S_{\psi}}$ is large.
- **Lemma**: Neighbors of S_{ψ} receive \mathcal{M} .

 $S \subseteq V$: sending with probability p. H[S] has **nodes** S and **reliable edges** E[S]. E[S] contains (u, v) iff **v** receives message from **u** with probability $\geq \mu$.



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 $S \subseteq V$: sending with probability *p*. H[S] has **nodes** *S* and **reliable edges** E[S]. E[S] contains (u, v) iff **v** receives message from **u** with probability $\geq \mu$.



Previous Lemma: Choose μ such that *short edges* $(d(u, v) \leq 2d_{\min}^S)$ are in E[S].

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Previous Lemma: Choose μ such that *short edges* $(d(u, v) \le 2d_{\min}^S)$ are in E[S]. **Constant degree** of $\Delta \le 1/\mu$.

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$$\sigma_{u,v} := \mathbb{P}\big(SINR(u,v,I) \geq \beta_{\max}\big) \quad \tau_{u,v} := \mathbb{P}\big(SINR(u,v,I) \geq \beta_{\min}\big).$$



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■ H[S] contains all μ -safe edges



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- H[S] contains all μ -safe edges
- H[S] may contain μ -unsafe edges (adversary decides)



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- H[S] contains all μ -safe edges
- H[S] may contain μ -unsafe edges (adversary decides)
- H[S] does not contain any other edges



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SINR-Induced Graphs - Computation

- \blacksquare H[S] cannot be pre-computed due to the adversary.
- Instead provide **sub-procedure** TRANSMIT that nodes in *S* execute.
- For pair $u, v \in S$ participating in TRANSMIT:
 - If $\{u, v\}$ is μ -safe: Message transmitted.
 - If (u, v) is μ -unsafe: Adversary decides.
 - Otherwise: Message not transmitted.
- **Edges along which transmission takes place induce** H[S].
- **TRANSMIT probes edges** by sending with prob. p for $O(\log n)$ rounds.
- TRANSMIT allows transmission if sufficiently many probes were successful.

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Dominating Independent Set (DIS) [Censor-Hillel et al., 2014]

Let G = (V, E, E') be a graph with disjoint edge sets E and E'. A *DIS* $D \subseteq V$ of *G* is *independent* w.r.t. *E* and *dominating* w.r.t. $E \cup E'$.

Independent Set: Let G = (V, E) be a graph. *Ind* $\subseteq V$ of *G* is *independent* if for all $u, v \in Ind$ there is **no** edge $\{u, v\} \in E$.

Dominating Set: Let G = (V, E') be a graph. *Dom* $\subseteq V$ of *G* is *dominating* if for all $v \in V \setminus Dom$ there is a node $u \in Dom$ and an edge $(u, v) \in E'$.

Edges E[S] of H[S] can be partitioned into

- $E_{\text{safe}}[S] : \mu$ -safe edges
- $E_{\text{unsafe}}[S] : \mu$ -unsafe edges.

- Combine algorithm by [Linial, 1992] with TRANSMIT: Obtain $\mathcal{O}(1)$ -coloring w.r.t. $E_{\text{safe}}[S]$ in $\mathcal{O}(\log n \log^* n)$ rounds.
- 2 For each color do
 - 3 Active nodes of current color join DIS ...
 - 4 ... and deactivate their neighbors via TRANSMIT in $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$.

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Neighbors w.r.t. $E_{safe}[S]$ are differently colored \Rightarrow **Independence w.r.t.** $E_{safe}[S]$.

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Neighbors w.r.t. $E_{\text{safe}}[S]$ are differently colored \Rightarrow **Independence w.r.t.** $E_{\text{safe}}[S]$. Node deactivated via TRANSMIT \Rightarrow **Node dominated w.r.t.** $E_{\text{safe}}[S] \cup E_{\text{unsafe}}[S]$.

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Algorithm RobustDissemination

For phase $\phi = 1$ to $\Theta(\log R)$ do:

- S_{ϕ} sends with prob. $\frac{p}{Q}$ for $\mathcal{O}(Q\log n)$ rounds $\mathcal{O}(\log n \cdot \operatorname{polylog}(R) \cdot \frac{\beta_{\max}}{\beta})$
- Determine DIS $S_{\phi+1}$ of $H[S_{\phi}]$

Property 1: There exists
$$Q$$
 such that nodes in $N(S)$ that did not receive \mathcal{M} yet, still have a neighbor in S_{ϕ} .
 $Q \in \mathcal{O}(\text{polylog } R \cdot \frac{\beta_{\text{max}}}{\beta_{\text{min}}})$

Property 2: In final phase ψ remaining active nodes S_{ψ} are 'sparse' \Rightarrow all neighbors of S_{ψ} receive \mathcal{M} (Lemma).

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 $\mathcal{O}(\operatorname{polylog} n)$

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 $\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}\left(\operatorname{polylog}(n+R) \cdot \frac{\beta_{\max}}{\beta_{\min}}\right) \text{ rounds to solve neighborhood dissemination.}$

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- $\blacksquare S_{\phi} \text{ sends with prob. } \frac{p}{Q} \text{ for } \mathcal{O}(Q \log n) \text{ rounds } \mathcal{O}(\log n \cdot \operatorname{polylog}(R) \cdot \frac{\beta_{\max}}{\beta_{\min}})$
- 2 Determine DIS $S_{\phi+1}$ of $H[S_{\phi}]$

$$\mathcal{O}(\operatorname{polylog} n)$$

Property 1: There exists Q such that nodes in N(S) that did not receive \mathcal{M} yet, still have a neighbor in S_{ϕ} . **Property 2**: In final phase ψ remaining active nodes S_{ψ} are 'sparse'

 \Rightarrow all neighbors of S_{ψ} receive \mathcal{M} (Lemma).

 $\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}\left(\operatorname{polylog}(n+R) \cdot \frac{\beta_{\max}}{\beta_{\min}}\right) \text{ rounds to solve neighborhood dissemination.} \\\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}\left(D \cdot \operatorname{polylog}(n+R) \cdot \frac{\beta_{\max}}{\beta_{\min}}\right) \text{ rounds to solve broadcast in the Unreliable Model.}$



Thank you.

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